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MASSACHUSETIS LAW-SURFACE WATERS-EFFECT OF REA­
SONABLE USE STANDARD ON SURFACE WATER CONTROVERSIES-­
Tucker v. Badoian, 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1294, 370 
N.E.2d 717, affd, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3207,384 N.E.2d 1195. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In October 1969, Mr. and Mrs. Raymond J. Tucker bought 
a house and parcel of land designated "lot 23" in Marshfield, 
Massachusetts, from Ronald Tocco. 1 Between the time the Tuckers 
first saw lot 23 and the time they purchased it, Morningside Realty 
Trust, the Tuckers' northern neighbor, filled and levelled part of 
Morningside's land in preparation for a proposed road. The filling 
caused subsurface water to back up onto lot 23. Within a week of 
the Tuckers' taking possession of lot 23, water began pouring into 
their cellar. The house and cellar smelled of raw sewage, and as 
much as three feet of water collected in the backyard. 2 The Tuck­
ers sued3 both Morningside Realty Trust and Badoian, trustee of 
1. Until the spring of 1969, lot 23 was an unimproved, muddy, marsh-like tract 
of land. During the spring and summer of 1969, Ronald Tocco, the owner, built a 
house on lot 23. He first filled in a drainage ditch that crossed the lot and then dug 
holes for the septic tank and cellar. The cellar is in the path of the former ditch. Dur­
ing construction these holes partially filled with water. Tucker v. Badoian, 1978 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 3207, 3210, 384 N.E.2d 1195, 1197. 
Lot 23 is bordered to the north by a lot belonging to Morningside Realty Trust, 
to the south by land uninvolved in this discussion, to the west by an old cranberry 
bog, and to the east by Winslow Cemetery Road. To the east of Winslow Cemetery 
Road are two ponds which drain through a man-made ditch and then through a cul­
vert under the road. Until Ronald Tocco filled in the ditch in the spring of 1969, the 
water then flowed into a ditch that crossed lot 23 and drained into a small pothole 
which lies partially on lot 23 and partially on Morningside's abutting land. Lot 23 
was both the locus of a system formerly used to flood the old cranberry bog and the 
low point of Winslow Cemetery Road. Id. at 3209-10, 384 N.E.2d at 1197. 
2. To alleviate these problems, Tocco installed a drainage system and filled in 
parts of the backyard. Polluted water, however, continued to collect in the cellar. 
Tucker v. Badoian, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3207, 3211, 384 N.E.2d 1195, 1198. Although 
the evidence did not clearly establish the water's source, due to the slope of the land 
and the placement of the pothole, the court inferred that the water in the backyard 
was overflow from the pothole. Id. at 3211 n.5, 384 N.E.2d at 1198 n.5. 
3. The plaintiffs brought three other actions relating to the same property 
against other defendants. All three were decided in plaintiffs' favor at trial and were 
upheld on appeal. Two of the actions, Tucker v. Tocco and Tucker v. Patriot Homes, 
Inc., were disposed of on October 31, 1977 by a summary affirmance of judgment for 
the plaintiffs. See Tucker v. Patriot Homes, Inc., 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1127. 
The third action, against Tocco as trustee of Ronald Realty Trust, was disposed of by 
the same rescript in which the appeals court reversed the judgment for the plaintiffs 
against Morningside Realty Trust and Badoian. See Tucker v. Badoian, 1977 Mass. 
App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1294,1295,370 N.E.2d 717, 718. 
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Morningside, for negligence and sought recovery for the damages 
to their house and land. 4 
At trial, the Plymouth County Superior Court held for the 
Tuckers, and the appeals court reversed. 5 The Massachusetts Su­
preme Judicial Court granted review and held in Tucker v. 
Badoian6 that the trial judge erred in denying the defendants' 
motion for a directed verdict and entered judgment for the de­
fendants. Since neither of the parties asked that the existing law 
be changed, the court applied the long-standing common enemy 
rule to the case. 7 Stated generally, the "common enemy" rule, as 
applied to surface water disputes, allows a property owner to im­
prove his land and thereby cause water to flow onto his neighbor's 
land without incurring liability for his neighbor's damages. 8 Thus, 
Morningside and Badoian were not liable for the damages caused 
to their neighbors by their land improvements. Although the court 
recognized that the defendants might have contributed to the 
plaintiffs' damages, under the common enemy rule as followed in 
Massachusetts, there would be no liability without proof that the 
defendants "caused surface water, which might otherwise have 
been absorbed or have flowed elsewhere, to be artificially 
channelled and discharged on the plaintiff's land in a place and 
quanitity sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief."9 As the defen­
dants did not use an artificial channel in causing water to flow onto 
the plaintiffs' land, the defendants were not liable for the resulting 
damage. 
A concurring opinion by Justice Benjamin Kaplan, with five 
justices joining, stated that future quarrels10 between landowners 
4. The plaintiffs contended that the defendants negligently made physical 
changes to the defendants' land to the detriment of the plaintiffs. See Tucker v. 
Badoian, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3207, 3207, 384 N.E.2d 1195, 1196. 
5. The jury awarded the plaintiffs $60,000. The defendants moved for a di­
rected verdict and later for a new trial. After a hearing, the judge denied the directed 
verdict and reduced the award to $25,000. The appeals court reversed, holding that 
the trial judge had erred in denying defendants' motion for a directed verdict. 
Tucker v. Badoian, id. at 3207-08, 384 N.E.2d at 1196-97. 
6. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3207, 3208-09, 384 N.E.2d 1195, 1196. 
7. Id. at 3215, 384 N.E.2d at 1199. 
8. See Gannon v. Hargadon, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 106, 109 (1865) (adopting the 
common enemy rule for resolution of surface water disputes). See also notes 19-22 
infra and accompanying text (discussion of the common enemy rule). 
9. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3214, 384 N.E.2d at 1199. See notes 44-54 infra and 
accompanying text (discussion of Massachusetts' modifications and exceptions to the 
common enemy rule and the artificial channel exception). 
10. The reasonable use standard is to be applied to conduct occurring after the 
decision in Tucker, "excepting future conduct so related in a continuum with past 
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concerning surface waters will be resolved by the reasonable use 
standard instead of by the common enemy rule.ll Although Jus­
tice Kaplan did not define "reasonable use" or set up guidelines for 
determining what constitutes a reasonable use of land, he did sug­
gest consulting several out-of-state cases12 and the Restatement of 
TortS 13 in deciding future disputes concerning surface water diver­
sion. By not defining "reasonable use," the Massachusetts court 
leaves property owners in the unenviable situation of not knowing 
whether contemplated land improvements will result in liability for 
subsequent surface water diversion until the improvement is afait 
accompli. 
This note discusses the evolution of the Massachusetts rules 
governing surface water diversion, the suitability of the reasonable 
use standard for use in Massachusetts and the need for a clear 
standard to use in determining reasonableness in the context of 
surface water diversion. 
II. BACKGROUND 
During the booming urban development of the second half of 
the nineteenth century, surface water controversies increased rap­
idly.14 Because land excavation and road building central to this 
development affected surface water15 drainage, surface water con­
troversies arose. States resolved these controversies in three ways. 
Most states adopted either the common enemy rule16 or the civil 
conduct that it would be unjust to apply the new standard to it." 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 3220, 384 N.E.2d at 1202. 
11. Justices Hennessey, Braucher, Wilkins, Liacos and Abrams joined concur­
ring. Thus, six of the seven justices hearing the case supported the adoption of the 
reasonable use rule. Id. at 3218,384 N.E.2d at 1201. 
12. See note 85 infra. 
13. See note 86 infra. 
14. The nineteenth century was the first time the urban population was 
increasing faster than the rural population. Bridges, The Application of Sur/ace 
Water Rules in Urban Areas, 42 Mo. L. REV. 76, 77 (1977). 
15. Surface water is generally defined as runoff from rain or melting snow or 
ice. MASS. WATER RESOURCES COMM'N, COMPILATION AND SUMMARIZATION OF 
THE MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL LAWS, SPECIAL LAWS, PERTINENT COURT DECI­
SIONS, ETC. RELATING TO WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 31 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 
COMPILATION & SUMMARIZATION]. 
When a landowner improves his property by building structures or paving 
ground, he often renders impervious the previously bare ground. The result may be 
that surface water, which before the improvement spread fanwise across adjacent 
property, now flows in a concentrated manner and in an increased volume thereby 
causing damage to the adjacent property. See note 14 supra at 76. 
16. See notes 19-22 infra and accompanying text (discussion of the common en­
emy approach). 
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law rule,17 while one state, New Hampshire, adopted the reason­
able use rule. 18 
The common enemy approach to the resolution of surface 
water controversies is based on property law concepts. The term 
"common enemy" was first used in the 1875 New Jersey decision 
of Town of Union v. Durkes19 which stated "surface water was the 
common enemy, which every proprietor may fight and get rid of as 
best he may. "20 The common enemy rule allows a landowner to 
deal with surface waters as he pleases without incurring liability for 
harm he may cause to others.21 Those states adopting the common 
enemy rule believed it would foster land development since the 
developer need not bear the costs to others of his improvements. 22 
At a time when urban development was greatly desired, courts 
were reluctant to set precedents contrary to this social goal. 
The "civil law" rule,23 a rule also based on property law, holds 
17. See notes 23-26 infra and accompanying text (discussion of the civil law 
rule). 
18. New Hampshire first applied the reasonable use rule to the flow of subter­
ranean waters. See Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569 (1862). The application 
of the reasonable use rule was extended to interference with the flow of surface 
waters in Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439, 446 (1870). See notes 34-37 & 61-70 infra and 
accompanying text (discussion of the reasonable use rule). 
19. 38 N.J.L. 21 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1875). 
20. Id. at 22. 
21. Gannon v. Hargadon, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 106, 109 (1865); see note 14 supra 
at 84; Kinyon & McClure, Interferences with Surface Waters, 24 MINN. L. REV. 891 
(1940). 
22. For a discussion of why courts adopted the common enemy rule see Kinyon 
& McClure, supra note 21, at 898-99. Kinyon and McClure state three reasons courts 
adopted the common enemy rule for the resolution of surface water disputes: (1) The 
traditional concept of land ownership is that landowners should be able to do as they 
please with their land; (2) some courts believed that the common enemy rule repre­
sented the common law rule although this fact is in dispute; (3) the common enemy 
rule is consistent with the social policy of furthering land development. [d. Bridges 
states that the social policy of furthering land development is the only reason for 
adopting the common enemy rule that has substantial importance today. See note 14 
supra at 85. 
See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974) for a criticism of the nine­
teenth century limitation of liability for the fostering of land development: 
It seems apparent to the twentieth century mind, as perhaps it did not 
to the nineteenth century mind, that a system in which everybody is invited 
to do his own thing, at whatever cost to his neighbor, must work ultimately 
to the benefit of the rich and powerful, who are in a position to look after 
themselves and to act, so to say, as their own self-insurers. As we look back 
on the nineteenth century theories, we are struck most of all, I think, by the 
narrow scope of social duty which they implicitly assumed. No man is his 
brother's keeper; the race is to the swift; let the devil take the hindmost. 
[d. at 95. 
23. The civil law rule was first adopted in Orleans Navigation Co. v. Mayor of 
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an improving landowner who interferes with the natural flow of 
surface waters liable for resulting injuries to other landowners. This 
approach recognizes a servitude of natural drainage. Lower owners 
must accept surface water draining onto their land while upper 
owners may not alter natural systems of drainage to the lower own­
ers' detriment. Thus, under the civil law approach, each landowner 
must leave the natural drainage system undisturbed or risk liability 
for any injury to his adjoining landowners.24 States adopting this 
civil law rule believed that holding liable a person changing the 
natural flow of waters was fair. 25 These states also believed the rule 
would not inhibit urban growth or development. 26 
Problems arose in applying either the common enemy or civil 
law rules to the wide variety of conflicts which occurred within a 
given jurisdiction. 27 A strict application of the civil law rule did, in 
practice, tend to hinder land improvement since the improver had 
to bear the costs to others of his improvements. On the other 
hand, while the common enemy rule fostered free land improve-
New Orleans, 2 Mart. 214 (La. 1812). The court held that an owner of lower ground 
is bound to receive water running from that of a superior landowner; but the water 
must be received as it flows by the course of nature, and it cannot be altered or 
modified, except by agreement between the parties interested. Id. at 232-33. Bridges 
states that at one time the civil law rule was followed by at least 27 states. See note 
14 supra at 79. 
24. See note 14 supra at 78. 
25. The reasoning for adoption of the civil law rule was clearly stated in 
Gormley v. Sanford, 52 III. 158 (1869), as follows: 
As water must flow, and some rule in regard to it must be established ... 
there can clearly be no other rule at once so equitable and so easy of appli­
cation as that which enforces natural laws. There is no surprise or hardship 
in this, for each successive owner takes with whatever advantages or incon­
veniences nature has stamped upon his land. 
Id. at 162. 
26. Bridges states that there are highly urbanized states that follow the civil 
law rule without their growth rate being discouraged. See note 14 supra at 83. See 
also Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 621, 691 (1968), 
which states that cases claiming that the civil law rule discourages land improvement 
assume that land developers' decisions are influenced by rules regarding surface 
waters, and that the cases do not mention data to support this assumption. 
27. See Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966), 
where the Supreme Court of California held that, since the civil law rule may be too 
rigid and occasionally unjust in heavily developed areas, the rule must be modified 
by a test of reasonableness. In Lunsford v. Stewart, 95 Ohio App. 383, 120 N.E.2d 
136 (1953) and Mulder v. Tague, 85 S.D. 544, 186 N.W.2d 884 (1971), courts refused 
to strictly apply the civil law rules to urban areas. 
See note 14 supra at 86-91 (problems of applying a strict common enemy rule 
and the resulting modifications to the rule). See also notes 44-54 & 79 infra and ac­
companying text. 
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ment, it also established a belief in landowners that might made 
right. 28 For example, if a person filled his land, thereby causing 
surface waters to flow onto his neighbor's land, the neighbor could 
build an embankment and force the water to flow back onto the 
improver's land, thus rendering the improvement useless. To cope 
with the problems encountered in applying these rules to widely 
varying situations, exceptions and modifications to the rules 
arose. 29 Some states applied one rule to urban areas and another to 
rural areas,30 or incorporated the tort principles of "reasonable­
ness" and "negligence" into their rules. 31 
As the overwhelming importance ascribed to land develop­
ment during the industrial revolution diminished, the courts re­
flected this change in social policy by further modifying the com­
mon enemy and civil law rules. Eventually, too many such 
modifications caused the rules to lose their effectiveness and cre­
ated a great deal of confusion.32 To determine whether an im­
provement would result in liability for subsequent surface water di­
version, one would first have to determine what the general rule 
was and then thread through numerous exceptions and modifica­
tions made to the general rule. To alleviate this confusion, several 
states adopted a reasonable use rule for resolving surface water 
controversies. 33 
28. Maloney & Plager, Diffused Surface Water: Scourge or Bounty? 8 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 73, 78 (1968). 
29. See note 27 supra. See also notes 44-54 & 79 infra and accompanying text 
(modifications made to the common enemy rule by the Massachusetts courts). 
30. Id. 
31. See Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966); 
Bates v. Westboro, 151 Mass. 174, 23 N.E. 1070 (1890); Lunsford v. Stewart, 95 Ohio 
App. 383, 120 N.E.2d 136 (1953). See also notes 50-52 infra and accompanying text 
(Massachusetts' insertion of negligence into the common enemy rule). 
32. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 21, at 931-35 (discussion of the numerous 
and confusing qualifications of the civil law and common enemy rules). 
33. Before 1956 only two states had adopted the reasonable use rule for the res­
olution of surface water disputes. See Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 32 
N.W.2d 286 (1948), where Minnesota adopted the reasonable use rule and Swett v. 
Cutts, 50 N.H. 439 (1870), where New Hampshire adopted the reasonable use rule 
for the resolution of surface water disputes. 
States that have recently adopted the reasonable use rule include: Weinberg v. 
Northern Alaska Dev. Corp., 384 P.2d 450 (Alaska 1963); Rodrigues v. State, 52 
Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); Tucker v. Badoian, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3207, 384 
N.E.2d 1195 (for future controversies); Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 
A.2d 4 (1956); Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 236 S.E.2d 787 (1977); Jones v. 
Boeing Co., 153 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1967); Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.1. 264, 341 A.2d 735 
(1975); Mulder v. Tague, 85 S.D. 544, 186 N.W.2d 884 (1971) (for urban land); City 
of Houston v. Renault, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1968) (for urban land); Sanford v. 
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The reasonable use rule, emanating not from property but 
from tort principles, gives a landowner the right to make reason­
able alterations to the flow of surface waters without incurring lia­
bility for the harm resulting to others.34 Factors relevant in 
determining liability vary according to jurisdiction, but they gener­
ally include the necessity for the drainage, the care taken to avoid 
injury to the land receiving the water, the benefit to the improved 
land compared to the resulting harm to the damaged land, and the 
reasonableness and feasibility of the drainage system adopted. 35 
The reasonable use rule is noted for its flexibility.36 While the 
common enemy and civil law rules require many modifications and 
exceptions to avoid harsh results in their application to urban and 
rural areas,37 the reasonable use rule can be applied to both areas 
without the need for these numerous and confusing modifications. 
III. DEVELOPMENT OF SURFACE WATER LAw 
IN MASSACHUSETTS 
The earliest approach followed by Massachusetts in resolving 
surface water disputes was a strict common enemy rule first 
adopted in Luther v. Winnisimmet CO.38 In Luther, the court held 
University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971); State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 
1,224 N.W.2d 407 (1974). 
Several other states have modified the common enemy or civil law rules to a 
point approaching actual adoption of the reasonable use rule. See Keys v. Romley, 64 
Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966); Templeton v. Huss, 57 III. 2d 
134, 31l N.E.2d 141 (1974); K1utey v. Commonwealth Dep't of Highways, 428 
S.W.2d 766 (Ky. 1967); Baer v. Board of County Comm'rs, 255 Md. 163, 257 A.2d 201 
(1969); Lunsford v. Stewart, 95 Ohio App. 383, 120 N.E.2d 136 (1953) (for urban 
land); Morris v. McNicol, 83 Wash. 2d 491, 519 P.2d 7 (1974). 
34. See, e.g., Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439 (1870). In Swett, where the reason­
able use rule was first adopted in New Hampshire, the court stated that in 
determining reasonableness one should consider all the circumstances of the case, 
among them the nature and importance of the improvement, the extent of the inter­
ference, the amount of injury to the other landowners as compared with the value of 
the improvement, and whether or not the injury could have reasonably been 
foreseen. ld. at 446. 
35. See note 34 supra & note 85 infra and accompanying text (factors used in 
determining reasonableness of surface water diversion in several states). 
36. Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 330, 120 A.2d 4, 10 (1956); 
Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201,216,236 S.E.2d 787, 796 (1977); Butler v. Bruno, 
115 R.I. 264, 274, 341 A.2d 735, 741 (1975); see note 14 supra at 96-97. 
37. See notes 27-32 supra and accompanying text. 
38. 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 171 (1851). The term "common enemy" is not used in 
the opinion, however, the elements of the rule are stated. Water from the plaintiff's 
land drained into a pond on the defendant's land. The defendant filled in the pond, 
thereby obstructing the flow of water from the plaintiff's land, and the plaintiff sued 
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that one landowner is free to stop surface water from entering his 
land despite harm to his neighbor. The Massachusetts court reaf­
firmed this approach in Gannon v. Hargadon 39 holding: 
[In the Massachusetts application of the common enemy rule, it 
is not material] whether a party obstructs or changes the direc­
tion and flow of surface water by preventing it from coming 
within the limits of his land, or by erecting barriers or changing 
the level of the soil, so as to tum it off in a new course after it 
has come within its boundaries. 40 
The court stressed that a landowner has a right to the free and un­
fettered control of his land which cannot be interfered with by any 
considerations of injury caused to others by interference with the 
flow of surface waters. 41 At that time, in order to promote land de­
velopment, the Massachusetts court applied the common enemy 
rule in a pure form. 42 
To prevent the unjust results which arose from the strictness 
and rigidity of the common enemy rule in its pure form, the 
Massachusetts court43 began making exceptions and modifications 
to this rule. 44 One such modification was the artificial channel ex-
for the resulting damages. The court held that the plaintiff would have a right of 
drainage from his land to the defendant's land if the water flowed through a water­
course, but the plaintiff would not have a right of drainage if the water was merely 
surface water. Id. at 174. 
"Watercourse" is defined as a stream, usually flowing in a definite channel, hav­
ing a bed and sides or banks. The size is not important, and the flow need not be 
constant, but it must be more than a mere surface drainage over an entire face of a 
tract of land. Id. at 174. 
39. 92 Mass. (10 Alle'n) 106 (1865). Melting snow and rain flowed through a 
ditch to the north of the defendant's land and then flowed over a way and through 
ruts upon the defendant's land. The defendant placed turf in the ruts and upon his 
own land to protect the way from injury, thereby causing water to flow onto the 
plaintiff's land. 
40. Id. at 109-10. 
41. Id. The court stated that the free and unfettered control extended to "law­
ful appropriation of land by its owner to a particular use or mode of enjoyment." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
42. See note 22 supra and accompanying text (discussion of limiting liability as 
a means of promoting the social policy of furthering land development in the nine­
teenth century). 
43. Massachusetts laws governing the use of surface waters have been primar­
ily developed judicially and not legislatively. "There is no reference in the General 
Laws to any authority to regulate water use beyond the references to pollution, 
drinking and swimming water standards and the right to use certain public water 
for fishing, fowling, etc." MASS. WATER RESOURCES COMM'N, A SUMMARY OF 
MASSACHUSETTS STATE LAWS, POLICIES & PROGRAMS PERTAINING TO WATER & 
RELATED LAND RESOURCES 68 (1971). 
44. See Butler v. Bruno, U5 RI. 264, 269-70, 341 A.2d 735, 739 (1975) 
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ception first expressed in 1866 in Franklin v. Fisk. 45 In Frank­
lin, the court held that a landowner may not collect surface water 
into an artificial channel and then discharge it upon his neighbor's 
land. 46 A few years later, in Jackman v. Arlington Mills,47 the 
Massachusetts court modified this artificial channel exception by 
holding that a landowner may use an artificial channel to discharge 
surface water into a watercourse48 if the watercourse is "the natural 
outlet of the waters thus collected, even though, by this artificial 
arrangement, the flow of waters is accelerated, and the volume at 
times is increased ...."49 In Bates v. Inhabitants of West­
borough,50 this exception was further modified by expanding the 
improving landowner's liability to include resulting damages when 
surface water in an artificial channel is deflected upon another's 
land by either the improver's setting an obstacle in its direct 
course or by negligently allowing an obstacle to remain. 51 Thus, 
amidst the numerous modifications of the common enemy rule, the 
(discussion of the rigid fonnulations of property law on which both the civil law and 
the common enemy rules are based); State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 14-16, 224 N.W.2d 
407, 414-15 (1974) (discussion of the need to modify the common enemy rule in or­
der to implement changing social needs). Bridges states that certain modifications, 
such as the due care modifications, merely mitigate the harshness of the common 
enemy rule. See note 14 supra at 88. See also note 52 infra (an example of Massa­
chusetts' insertion of the due care modification, referred to as the tort element of 
negligence, into one of its exceptions to the common enemy rule). 
45. 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 211 (1866). The plaintiffs built a culvert across a high­
way which caused surface water to flow onto the defendant's land. The defendant 
blocked the culvert thereby preventing the flow of much of the water from entering 
the defendant's land and causing it to flow over and injure the highway. 
46. Id. at 211. 
47. 137 Mass. 277 (1884). The defendant built tenement houses and cesspools 
on his land. The sink water from the houses and the cesspools emptied into a ditch 
on the defendant's land which connected with a brook about 500 feet from the 
plaintiff's land. Surface water from the defendant's land also flowed through the 
ditch and then into the brook. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's acts in­
creased the water in the brook causing it to overflow into the plaintiff's cellar re­
sulting in the house being unfit for habitation. 
48. See note 38 supra (definition of "watercourse"). 
49. 137 Mass. at 283. This modification of the artificial channel exception is fur­
ther qualified by the requirement that the landowner's action be "done in the rea­
sonable use of his ... land, and that the discharge is not beyond the natural capacity 
of the watercourse, and the land of a riparian owner is not thereby overflowed, and 
materially injured." [d. 
SO. 151 Mass. 174,23 N.E. 1070 (1890). Bates involved a town's new drainage 
system. The new system discharged more water more rapidly through a culvert than 
the old system. The culvert filled up, and the drain failed at times to discharge water 
freely. The drain on the plaintiff's side of the culvert filled up and overflowed onto 
the plaintiff's land. 
51. Id. at 181, 23 N.E. at 1071. 
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Massachusetts court inserted the tort element of negligence. 52 As 
recently as 1957, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court once 
again qualified this exception by holding that an artificial channel 
may, if in existence for a long time, be treated as a watercourse. 53 
Under Massachusetts law watercourses are treated separately from 
surface water. 54 Since its adoption of the common enemy rule, 
Massachusetts has continued to modify this rule in an effort to 
achieve more equitable results. As the artificial channel exception 
illustrates, however, the common enemy rule is not well suited to 
meet this task. The inflexibility of the common enemy rule necessi­
tates numerous modifications which render the rule ineffective and 
confusing. 
In Tucker v. Badoian,55 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court wisely decided to abandon its modified common enemy rule 
and to adopt the reasonable use rule for subsequent controver­
sies. 56 With its adoption of the common enemy rule in the nine­
teenth century, the Massachusetts court had implemented the then 
existing social policy of fostering land development. 57 By rejecting 
52. Assessing the elements of negligence or lack of reasonable care was merely 
a modification of the common enemy rule in Massachusetts before the decision in 
Tucker. Absent negligence or lack of reasonable care the common enemy rule was 
applied. See notes 50-51 infra and accompanying text. See also note 14 supra at 88 
("due care" modification). Bridges criticizes this modification as it only serves to mit­
igate the harshness of the common enemy rule when the improving landowner is 
negligent. Id. 
53. Kuklinska v. Maplewood Homes, 336 Mass. 489, 146 N.E.2d 523 (1957). An 
artificial channel on the defendant's land drained surface water into a swamp that 
was partially on the plaintiff's land. This artificial channel had "been in existence 
within the memory of man." ld. at 490, 146 N.E.2d at 524. There was testimony that 
the channel had been in existence.for 150 years. ld. at 493, 146 N.E.2d at 526. The 
court held that, although the plaintiff may have objected to the maintenance of the 
channel at an earlier time, due to its long existence, it is to be treated as a water­
course, and there remains a right to have the same flow continue. Id. at 494, 146 
N.E.2d at 526. 
54. For a brief summary of Massachusetts laws pertaining to watercourses see 
COMPILATION & SUMMARIZATION, supra note 15, at 17-24,269. 
Although the artificial channel exception imposes liability on a landowner who 
collects surface water into an artificial channel and then discharges the water upon 
his neighbor's land, the exception does not impose liability when the water is dis­
charged into a watercourse to which the water would naturally have flowed, even 
though the flow of the water is accelerated and the volume is increased. See notes 
45-53 supra and accompanying text. 
55. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3207,384 N.E.2d at 1195. 
56. ld. at 3218-20, 384 N.E.2d at 1201-02. See notes 1-13 supra and accompa­
nying text. 
57. See note 22 supra and accompanying text (discussion of the nineteenth cen­
tury social policy of furthering land development). 
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the common enemy rule and adopting the reasonable use rule in 
1978, the Massachusetts court has taken a great step toward imple­
menting the current social policy of just allocation of development 
costs. 58 That a person should have "free and unfettered control of 
his property,"59 a basic tenet of the common enemy rule, is no 
longer in harmony with current social policy.6o Although there is 
still a concern with land development for the greater good of soci­
ety, justice is better served by the reasonable use rule which pre­
vents the profit making developer from taking actions which are 
unreasonable in light of all circumstances surrounding his action 
and also which makes him liable for the resulting costs to others of 
his improvements when he fails to take such reasonable actions. 61 
This awareness of changing social policy has been the basis for 
justifications for the abandonment of both the civil law and com­
mon enemy rules in several states. As stated in State v. Deetz,62 in 
which Wisconsin adopted the reasonable use rule in favor of the 
common enemy rule: 
[The common enemy rule] is not a timeless rule of property. 
Rather, it is one that apparently served the temporary purposes 
of society well in tlIe days of burgeoning national expansion of 
the mid-nineteenth and early-twentietlI centuries. The concept 
tlIat a [sic] owner of real property can, in all cases, do as he 
pleases with his property is no longer in harmony with the reali­
ties of our society. 63 
When New Jersey abandoned the common enemy rule and 
adopted the reasonable use rule in Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 64 
the court reasoned that, although building projects are in the social 
good, there is no reason for the adjoining landowners, rather than 
the profit making builders themselves, to bear the economic costs 
incident to the builders' expulsion of surface waters. "Social prog­
58. See notes 62-70 infra and accompanying text (discussion of policy reasons 
for favoring the adoption of the reasonable use rule). 
59. Gannon v. Hargadon, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) at 109. 
60. See State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 15-16, 224 N.W.2d 407, 414 (1974), where 
in discussing the rejection of the common enemy rule the court states that "[w]hen a 
rule of law thwarts social policy rather than promotes it, it is the obligation of a com­
mon law court to undo or modifY a rule that it has previously made." 
61. See notes 34 supra & note 85 infra (tests used in determining reasonable­
ness in the context of surface water diversion). See also notes 88-96 infra (suggested 
test for determining reasonableness in the context of surface water diversion). 
62. 66 Wis. 2d 1,224 N.W.2d 407 (1974). 
63. ld. at 14-15,224 N.W.2d at 414. 
64. 20 N.J. 320, 329, 120 A.2d 4, 10 (1956). 
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ress and the common wellbeing are in actuality better served by a 
just and right balancing of the competing interests according to the 
general principles of fairness and common sense which attend the 
application of the rule of reason. "65 In Butler v. Bruno,66 the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court noted the reasonable use rule's flexi­
bility in its applicability to "situations unthought of in the day 
when surface water was truly considered to be the common en­
emy."67 The court decided that the rule would "permit a more eq­
uitable allocation of the costs of. . . improvements, for the owner 
improving his land must take into consideration the true cost of 
such development to the community."68 When North Carolina 
abandoned the civil law rule and adopted the reasonable use rule 
in Pendergrast v. Aiken,69 the court noted that the numerous mod­
ifications made to the old rule, necessary to permit the reasonable 
use of land, 
ha[ve] resulted in uncertainty of the law and reduced predic­
tibility.... [The reasonable use rule] can be applied effectively, 
fairly and consistently in any factual setting ... and thus has the 
capacity to accommodate changing social needs . . . . [and] is 
more in line with the realities of modern life and that consist­
ency, fairness and justice are better served through the flexibil­
ity afforded by that rule. 70 
The flexibility of the reasonable use rule makes it especially 
appropriate for application in a state as diverse as Massachusetts. 
Massachusetts has great variations in geography, climate, and pop­
ulation distribution and has varying water problems in different 
areas. 71 Although rainfalF2 is rather evenly distributed throughout 
the year, it rains more frequently in the upland areas. 73 Snowfall, 
65. Id. at 330, 120 A.2d at 10. 
66. 115 R.1. 264, 341 A.2d 735 (1975). 
67. Id. at 274, 341 A.2d at 741. 
68. Id. 
69. 293 N.C. 201, 216, 236 S.E.2d 787,796 (1977). 
70. Id. at 215-16, 236 S.E.2d at 795-96. 
71. The land surface of Massachusetts is mountainous along the western border 
and generally hilly elsewhere. But certain coastal areas consist of flat land with 
marshes and small ponds and lakes. The climate of the state has wide daily and an­
nual variations in temperature and precipitation. There are large differences between 
the same seasons in different years with great diversity between areas. WATER RE­
SOURCES RESEARCH CENTER, YIELD OF STREAMS IN MASSACHUSETTS 3-5 (1967). 
72. Thirty-four to seventy percent of the rainfall becomes surface water. Id. 
at 5. 
73. Id. at 4. Since frequency of precipitation varies from area to area in 
Massachusetts and since such a large percentage of the precipitation becomes sur­
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which accounts for much surface water in the spring, increases rap­
idly from the coast westward. 74 Although Massachusetts does not 
have an overall water shortage, serious local shortages are pres­
ent. 75 It also has problems with the distribution of the available 
water supply and with the loss of potential water supplies due to 
increasing urbanization, especially around Boston. 76 Since surface 
water accounts for a great percentage of the fresh water used77 arid 
since all waters are interrelated in the hydrologic cycle,78 surface 
water laws will certainly have a far-reaching effect in Massa­
chusetts. 79 Due to the varying water problems in different parts of 
face water, Massachusetts' present water resource problem is one of distribution and 
management.ld. at 5. 
74. ld. at 4. Variations in seasonal accumulations of snow have ranged from 
over 100 inches in the west to less than four inches on Cape Cod, located in the 
southeastern part of the state. ld. at 5. 
75. Massachusetts uses approximately one billion two hundred million gallons 
of fresh water per day, and approximately one billion gallons of this water is from 
surface water supplies which are not evenly distributed throughout the state. ld. at 
3-5. 
The coastal area must depend on ground water supplies for fresh water which 
are replenished by coastal precipitation. MASS. DIV. OF WATER RESOURCES, 
GROUNDWATER & GROUNDWATER LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS 4 (1976). 
76. ld. at 3. 
77. See notes 72-74 supra. 
78. For an explanation of the hydrologic cycle see MASS. DIV. OF WATER RE­
SOURCES, GROUNDWATER & GROUNDWATER LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS (1976). 
79. Justice Kaplan's failure to define the term "surface water" in Tucker ob­
scures Massachusetts' new standard governing liability for surface water diversion. 
He explains that the reasonable use standard will be used to resolve "quarrels be­
tween landowners about surface waters." 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3219, 384 N.E.2d at 
1201 (emphasis added). It is unclear from Justice Kaplan's opinion whether the rea­
sonable use rule will apply to controversies involving only surface waters or to con­
- troversies involving subterranean waters as well. 
-, Although Massachusetts surface water rules once applied only to rain or melt­
ing snow or ice, the application of the rules has gradually expanded. In Wilson v. 
New Bedford, 108 Mass. 261 (1871), the Massachusetts court expanded application 
of the rules relating to surface waters to cover damages caused by underground 
percolating water. Principles of justice and economics were cited as reasons for ex­
panding application of the rules. ld. at 266-67. In Kennison v. Beverly, 146 Mass. 
467, 16 N.E. 278 (1888), application of the rules was further expanded by holding: 
no distinction in respect to legal liability between an injury to land from sur­
face water collected in gutters and catch basins which are below the surface 
of the adjoining land, and from which the water percolates through the soil, 
and an injury from surface water which, overflowing the gutters and catch 
basins, runs over the adjoining land, or which is turned directly upon it. 
ld. at 469, 16 N.E. at 280. Thus, the application of surface water laws, once gov­
erning only interference with water on the surface of land, was expanded to include 
interference with subterranean waters. 
In Deyo v. Athol Housing Auth., 335 Mass. 459, 140 N.E.2d 393 (1957), the 
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the state, a flexible reasonable use rule, which considers all the rel­
evant circumstances of each situation, is better adapted for 
resolving Massachusetts water problems than the more rigid com­
mon enemy rule. 80 
The most serious criticism of the reasonable use rule is that it 
sets no guidelines to provide landowners with a standard governing 
the use of their land. 81 This is precisely the situation in which Jus­
tice Kaplan's opinion leaves Massachusetts landowners. He writes: 
"[D]etails of the standard will evolve and be determined . . . 
through the decisional process. "82 A common but unpersuasive re­
tort to the criticism that the reasonable use rule lacks sufficient 
guidelines is that "desire for certainty of liability should not and 
must not serve as a judicial pardon for the unreasonable conduct 
which has been manifested by any landowner in our modem soci­
ety."83 Landowners and the lawyers with whom they consult, how­
ever, should have some guidelines to follow other than a rather 
ambiguous "reasonableness" doctrine in deciding whether to spend 
time and money on land improvements. 84 
Justice Kaplan suggests referring to cases from several states85 
court stated that a landowner is liable for resulting damages if he artificially retains 
surface water on his land "so that by its retention it is deflected or backed up upon 
another's land .... It is immaterial whether injury from water so collected or re­
tained results from the flow of surface water or from subsurface percolation." ld. at 
462, 140 N.E.2d at 395. 
80. See note 36 supra and accompanying text. 
81. See Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.I. at 275-76, 341 A.2d at 741, where Justice 
Joslin in dissent states that the reasonable use rule, though it may reflect current 
feelings about the use and development of land, is not sufficiently clear as stated by 
the majority opinion and thereby results in a landowner's not knowing what actions 
involving diversion of surface waters are legal and what actions are not legal and, 
thus, may result in liability. 
82. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3220, 384 N.E.2d at 1202. 
83. 115 R.l. at 275, 341 A.2d at 741. 
84. See generally 115 R.I. at 275-76,341 A.2d at 741 (Joslin, J., dissenting). 
85. Justice Kaplan suggests consulting the following cases for determining rea­
sonableness in the context of surface water diversion. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3218, 
3220,384 N.E.2d at 1201. 
Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956), which considers "all 
the relevant circumstances, including such factors as the amount of harm caused, the 
foreseeability of the harm which results, the purpose or motive with which the pos­
sessor acted, and all other relevant matter." ld. at 330, 120 A.2d at 10. Pendergrast 
weighs: 
the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff against the utility of the conduct to 
the defendant .... Determination of the gravity of the harm involves con­
sideration of the extent and character of the harm to the plaintiff, the social 
value which the law attaches to the type of use which is invaded, the 
suitability of the locality for that use, the burden on plaintiff to minimize the 
harm, and other relevant considerations arising upon the evidence. Determi­
C 
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and to the Restatement of Torts86 for guidance in determining rea­
sonableness. This guidance may, however, be of dubious value 
since Justice Kaplan states that the Massachusetts courts are not 
committed "to follow in every detail the position elaborated by any 
other court or by the Restatement. "87 
Arguably, the strength of the judicial system is to define rules on 
a case-by-case basis and, thus, gradually to develop a body of law. 
This process alleviates the need for numerous modifications and ex­
ceptions necessary under a restrictive rule such as the common en­
emy rule. But in laying the foundation of a new rule of law, the 
law should be sufficiently clear to allow a rational decision about 
nation of the utility of the conduct of the defendant involves consideration 
of the purpose of the defendant's conduct, the social value which the law at­
taches to that purpose, the suitability of the locality for the use defendant 
makes of the property, and other relevant considerations arising upon the 
evidence. 
293 N.C. at 217, 236 S.E.2d at 797. Butler states that liability turns on a determina­
tion of the reasonableness of the action and should be detennined upon the consid­
eration of all relevant circumstances. 115 R.I. at 272, 341 A.2d at 739. State v. Deetz, 
66 Wis. 2d at 16-18,224 N.W.2d at 415-16 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 822, at 22 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971), § 826, at 3 (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972), § 827, 
at 36 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971), § 828, at 41 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971); RESTATE­
MENT OF TORTS § 833 (1939)). 
86. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3219 n.3, 384 N.E.2d at 1201 n.3 (citing RESTATE­
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822-833, at 62-75 (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970), §§ 822, 
826-828, at 22-47 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971), §§ 822, 826, 829, at 1-6 (Tent. Draft No. 
18, 1972); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 822-831,833 (1939)). 
Section 833 states that "[n]on-trespassory invasions of a person's interest in the 
use and enjoyment of land resulting from another's interference with the flow of sur­
face water are governed by the rules stated in §§ 822-831." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 
§ 833 (1939). Section 822 states that one is subject to liability when "the invasion is 
either a) intentional and unreasonable, or b) unintentional and otherwise actionable 
under the principles controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for ab­
nonnally dangerous conditions or activities." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ~ 
822 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971). Section 826 states that an intentional act is deter­
mined to be unreasonable if "a) the gravity of the hann outweighs the utility of the 
actor's conduct, or b) the hann caused by the conduct is substantial and the financial 
burden of compensating for this and other harms does not render infeasible the con­
tinuation of the conduct." Id. § 826 (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972). Section 827 states that 
gravity of the hann is to be detennined by weighing "a) the extent of the harm in­
volved; b) the character of hann involved; c) the social value which the law attaches 
to the type of use or enjoyment invaded; d) the suitability of the particular use or en­
joyment invaded to the character of the locality; e) the burden on the person hanned 
of avoiding the hann." Id. § 827 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971). Section 828 states that 
the utility of the conduct is to be detennined by weighing a) the social value the law 
attaches to the conduct's purpose; b) the suitability of the conduct to the locality; c) 
whether it is impracticable to prevent or avoid the invasion if the act is continued; d) 
whether it is impracticable to continue the act if it is required to bear the cost of 
compensation. Id. § 828. 
87. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3220, 384 N.E.2d at 1202. 
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whether an act complies with the law and whether the actor will 
be liable for possible damages to others caused by the act. In 
deciding whether to improve his land, a landowner should know 
whether liability for possible damages to others will ensue and 
whether, in computing the cost of an improvement, he must in­
clude the cost to others caused by the improvement. 
Rather than citing varying and overlapping standards for 
determining reasonableness88 which the Massachusetts courts are 
not committed to follow,89 Justice Kaplan should have proposed 
one test stating the elements that the courts would consider when 
determining reasonableness in the context of surface water diver­
sion. The test for determining whether an improvement is reason­
able,90 and, therefore, whether the improver should not be liable 
for damages caused to others by his improvement's diversion of 
surface waters, should consider all the relevant circumstances 
including such factors as: (1) The value the law attaches to the im­
provement compared to the value the law attaches to the right or 
action of the injured party with which the improvement inter­
feres;91 (2) the benefit to society, the community, and the improver 
caused by the improvement compared to the detriment to society, 
the community, and the injured party caused by the improve­
ment;92 (3) the cost to the improver of avoiding or mitigating the 
injury compared to the cost to the injured party of avoiding or 
mitigating the injury;93 (4) whether the injury was foreseeable by 
88. See notes 85-86 supra. 
89. See note 87 supra and accompanying text. 
90. The test proposed in this paper is meant to be a guide for determining rea­
sonableness of surface water diversion. Each element listed may not be appropriate 
in every case, and the elements are not meant to be mutually exclusive. The pro­
posed test should give both decision makers and landowners a guideline for 
determining whether surface water diversion will give rise to liability for resulting 
damages. The proposed test contains elements of several other tests. See notes 85-86 
supra. 
91. See LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 232 U.S. 340 (1914), 
where the rights of the railroad, considered as a public improvement, are compared 
to an individual's private property rights. 
92. See Butler v. Bruno,,l15 R.I. at 274,341 A.2d at 741, for a discussion of the 
need to consider the true cost to the community of an improvement in order to 
achieve an equitable allocation of the costs of land improvement. See also Enderson 
v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 168-70, 32 N.W.2d 286, 289-90 (1948), which in de­
termining liability for surface water diversion considers whether the benefit to the 
improved land outweighs the harm resulting to others. 
93. See Keys v. Romlev, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 409, 412 P.2d 529, 537, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
396, 409 (1966), which is determining liability for surface water diversion considers 
both the duty of an improving landowner to take reasonable care to avoid injury to 
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the improver and, if the injury were foreseeable, whether the im­
prover knew or should have known of feasible alternate methods of 
improvement that would ,have avoided or mitigated the injury;94 
and (5) whether imposing liability on either the improver or the in­
jured party would preclude the continuance of an activity that is 
desired by society or by the community.95 
The applicability of this test can be examined by using' Tucker 
as the hypothetical. If this test were applied to Tucker, it would be 
necessary to determine exactly what improvement Badoian made to 
his land, and then the first and second elements of the test could 
be applied. If Badoian's improvement consisted of building a road 
to provide better access to a recreational area to be used solely by 
him, the first and second elements of the test would weigh toward 
holding him liable. 
Under the third element of the test, it is necessary to deter­
mine which party could avoid or mitigate the injury more inex­
pensively. If Badoian could have avoided all injury to the Tuckers 
by digging a drainage ditch costing $50, but the Tuckers could 
have avoided injury only by spending several thousand dollars to 
rebank their property, the third element of the test would weigh 
toward holding Badoian liable. 
Under the fourth element of the test, it would be necessary to 
determine whether the Tuckers' injury was foreseeable to Badoian. 
If it were foreseeable, it would be necessary to determine whether 
Badoian knew or should have known of feasible alternate methods 
of improvement that would have avoided or mitigated the injury. If 
Badoian knew that his improvement would result in substantial in­
jury to the Tuckers, and if he knew that the injury could have 
been avoided by digging a ditch costing only $50, the fourth ele­
ment would weigh toward holding him liable. 
Under the fifth element of the test, it is necessary to examine 
the nature of the defendant's improvement. If the improvement is 
one that is desired by society or by the community and if holding 
others and the duty of a person threatened with injury to his property by the flow of 
surface waters to take reasonable precautions to avoid or reduce the injury. 
94. See Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 168, 32 N.W.2d 286, 289 (1948) 
(in detennining liability for surface water diversion considers whether reasonable 
care has been taken to avoid unnecessary injury to the land receiving the water); 
Annstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. at 330, 120 A.2d at 10 (in detennining liability 
for the diversion of surface water considers the foreseeability of the hann caused). 
95. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying (discussion of the judiciary's pro­
motion of the nineteenth century social goal of furthering land development by not 
imposing liability for surface water diversion). 
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Badoian liable would preclude the desired improvement, this ele­
ment would weigh toward not holding him liable. If Badoian's im­
provement consisted of building a road to provide better access to 
a recreational area to be used solely by him, and imposing liability 
on him would preclude the building of the road by making the pro­
ject financially infeasible, it is unlikely that society or the commu­
nity would have sufficient interest in Badoian's improvement to 
free him from liability. In such a case, the fifth element of the test 
would weigh toward holding Badoian liable. Each relevant element 
of the test should be examined and weighed against the other ele­
ments to determine liability. 
The foreseeability portion of the test should be applied more 
or less stringently depending upon the circumstances. For exam­
ple, if the improvement is the building of a nuclear plant, the 
foreseeability portion of the test should be applied more strin­
gently. The large scale nature of such a project and the clear 
knowledge of far-reaching effects justify imposing the burden of 
investigating the possibility of damages to others and the feasibility 
of alternate methods of improvement. If the improvement is one 
that affects only neighboring landowners, however, the fore­
seeability portion of the test should be applied less stringently. A 
less stringent application of this portion of the test prevents the 
need for costly research to determine both the possibility of dam­
ages which might result from the improvement and the feasibility 
of alternate methods of improving the land. This is a task that few 
landowners would pursue before making an improvement and a 
task that few landowners could afford if the injured party brought 
suit. The rationale for not imposing this task on a small landowner 
whose improvement affects only his neighbor is that the effects of 
the improvement are not sufficiently far-reaching to justify the cost 
necessary for compliance with such a burden. Thus, whether an 
improver "knew or should have known of feasible alternate meth­
ods of improvement that would have avoided or mitigated the in­
jUry" depends on the circumstances of the particular case. 
The suggested test retains the flexibility necessary for a rule to 
be applied with equitable results in a state with diverse water 
problems. 96 It allows a landowner to make a rational, cost-based 
decision of whether to improve his land by allowing him to know 
96. See notes 71-80 supra and accompanying text (discussiori of Massachusetts' 
water problems). 
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whether his improvement will result in any liability for subsequent 
damages caused by surface water diversion and, therefore, whether 
he should consider potential liability costs in computing the total 
cost of the improvement. This test informs the landowner of the 
factors that will be used in determining liability and it precludes 
the uncertainty of liability that must follow Justice Kaplan's opin­
ion97 which stated varying and overlapping standards that the 
courts are not committed-to follow. 98 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Massachusetts laws governing surface water controversies have 
undergone cOntinual change. In order to promote land develop­
ment during the nineteenth century, Massachusetts adopted the 
common enemy rule for resolving these controversies. This rule al­
lows a landowner to improve his land and thereby alter the flow of 
surface water to his neighbor's detriment without incurring liability 
for his neighbor's damages. As the overwhelming importance as­
cribed to land development diminished, Massachusetts reflected 
this change in social policy by modifying and making exceptions to 
the common enemy rule. The modifications and exceptions gradu­
ally became so numerous that confusion and uncertainty resulted. 
In Tucker, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court wisely de­
cided to abandon its modified form of the common enemy rule and 
to adopt the flexible reasonable use rule for future controversies. 
By its adoption of the reasonable use rule in Tucker, 
Massachusetts has taken a great step toward implementing the cur­
rent social policy of just allocation of development costs. The rule 
is also well suited in its flexibility for use in a state with diverse 
water problems. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, how­
ever, failed to provide clear guidelines for determining what consti­
tutes a reasonable use of land in the context of surface water diver­
sion. 
Although surface water laws are extremely important due to 
their effect on the water cycle, courts can refer to only a narrow 
97. See notes 81 & 84 supra and accompanying text (discussion of the lack of 
guidelines provided by the reasonable use standard adopted by Rhode Island in But­
ler v. Bruno, 115 R.l. at 264, 341 A.2d at 735). 
98. See notes 85-86 supra (tests suggested as gUidance in determining reason­
ableness of surface water diversion in Massachusetts). See also note 87 supra and ac­
companying text (Massachusetts' failure to commit itself to following the suggested 
tests is discussed). 
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range of cases. Many years must necessarily elapse before the 
courts rule on a sufficient number of cases to evolve a clear mean­
ing of "reasonableness" in the context of surface water diversion. 
Rather than waiting many years, the Massachusetts court should 
adopt the test for determining reasonableness that is proposed in 
this note. The proposed test is sufficiently flexible to be equitably 
applied where there are diverse water problems, and it is suffi­
ciently clear in its guidelines to enable a landowner to make a ra­
tional, cost-based decision of whether to improve his land. The un­
certainty of liability will be obviated. The landowner, therefore, 
will be apprised of the factors used in determining liability and 
could direct his actions and decisions accordingly. 
Although the Massachusetts court deserves praise both for 
adopting a rule well suited in its flexibility for use and for fulfilling 
its role as an implementer of changing social policy, it should soon 
delineate clear guidelines for determining what constitutes a rea­
sonable use of land in the context of surface water diversion. 
Marcia Pechenik McCraw 
